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Milgram Revisited: Can we still use Milgram’s 
‘Obedience to Authority’ Experiments to Explain 




Milgram’s ‘obedience to authority experiments’ are, together with Zimbardo’s prison experiment, one of the most famous but also most controversial studies ever conducted.1 Since its first publication in 1963, Milgram’s 
research has drawn the attention not only of scholars but also of the 
media, and the experiment as well as the results have been widely 
debated and referenced, but also heavily criticized.2 The 50th anniversary 
of his experiments and the opening of the Yale archives led to a new 
wave of publications and criticism. A lot of material on the Milgram 
experiments which until then had been hidden from scholarly and 
public scrutiny cast serious doubts on Milgram’s actual findings and 
their relevance.3 Between 2011 and 2015, no fewer than four internation-
al peer-reviewed journals published a special issue on Milgram’s 
experiments: The Psychologist in 2011, edited by Reicher and Haslam; 
Theoretical & Applied Ethics in 2013, edited by Herara; the Journal of 
Social Issues in 2014, edited by Reicher, Haslam and Miller; and Theory 
& Psychology in 2015, edited by Brannigan, Nicholson and Cherry. In 
addition, Gina Perry published a book on the Milgram experiments in 
2012 entitled Behind the Shock Machine: The Untold Story of the Notorious 
I wish to thank Maria Ioannou, Chris Atkinson, George Smeulers, Nicola Quaedvlieg, and the editors of the 
journal for their useful suggestions, comments and corrections.
1  Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: Harper and Row, 1974); Philip G. 
Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil (New York: Random House, 2007).
2  One of the first to do so was Dianna Baumrind, ‘Some Thoughts on Ethics of Research: After Reading 
Milgram’s Behavioral Study of Obedience’, American Psychologist, 19.6 (1964), 421–423.
3  See ‘Stanley Milgram Papers’, Archives at Yale, <https://archives.yale.edu/repositories/12/resources/4865> 
[accessed 24 February 2020]. The opening of the archives also led to new public interest, see the two 
recent films Experimenter: The Stanley Milgram Story, dir. by Michael Almereyda (Magnolia Pictures, 2015) 
and Shock Room, dir. by Kathryn Millard (Charlie Productions, 2015).
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Milgram Psychology Experiments. The aim of this review essay is to assess 
to what extent the opening of the archives and these publications shed 
new light on Milgram’s experiments. The essay provides some information 
on Milgram and the experiment. It considers the initial criticism relating 
to the ethical dimension of Milgram’s studies (section 2) and then 
focuses on what was revealed after the opening of the archives (section 
3). In section 4, the main question addressed is whether Milgram’s 
experiments are in fact about obedience, while section 5 asks whether 
Milgram’s experiment can explain the Holocaust and other genocides.
Milgram: The Experimenter and the Experiment
Stanley Milgram was born in the United States in 1933. After graduating 
from high school – coincidentally the same school that Philip Zimbardo 
attended – Milgram went on to study political science and then 
obtained a PhD degree in psychology before going to work with Solomon 
Asch. The young and ambitious Milgram wanted to make a career of 
his own and to conduct experiments which would be more meaningful 
than ‘assessing the lengths of lines’.4 Initially, he wanted to prove 
that people in the United States in the sixties were less conformist than 
those in Germany in the forties,5 but the ongoing trial of Adolf Eichmann 
in which Eichmann kept repeating that he was merely obeying orders 
intrigued him.6 The loss of family members in the purges and death 
camps of Nazi Germany during the Second World War explains his 
interest in both the trial and the Holocaust. Milgram’s book suggests 
that he was disgusted by Eichmann’s defence and that he wanted to 
prove that people don’t just follow orders. His own findings, however, 
took him by surprise.
Although Milgram’s experiment is widely known and referred to 
in every single social-psychology textbook, a brief summary is fitting. 
Milgram told his subjects that they were participating in a learning 
experiment designed to test to what extent pain, administered in the 
form of electric shocks as a punishment for making mistakes, would 
4  See Gina Perry, Behind the Shock Machine: The Untold Story of the Notorious Milgram Psychology 
Experiments (Victoria, Au.:The New Press, 2013), p. 28; Nestar J.C. Russell, ‘Milgram’s Obedience to 
Authority Experiments: Origins and Early Evolution’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 50.1 (2011), 140–164 
(p. 147, pp. 149–150); Solomon E. Asch, ‘Opinions and Social Pressure’, Scientific American, 193 (1955) , 31–35.
5  Russell, p. 145.
6  The Eichmann trial was – unlike the earlier Nuremberg trials – a ‘landmark in television history’ which 
captured the attention of a wide audience. Perry, Behind the Shock Machine, p. 209.
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improve learning abilities. In reality, however, Milgram wanted to assess 
to what extent participants were prepared to give a fellow participant 
electric shocks when asked to do so. The participants had to start off 
by giving the learner an electric shock of 15 volts if they made an er-
ror learning word pairs. With each mistake the voltage increased 
a further 15 volts up until the maximum shock of 450 volts. Milgram 
conducted variations in the experiment and in some cases, the learner 
started to vehemently protest at being given shocks. Every time the 
participants wanted to quit, the experimenter used a series of standardized 
prods asking the participant to continue. The four prods were: (1) ‘please 
continue;’ (2) ‘the experiment requires you to continue;’ (3) ‘It is 
essential that you continue’ and (4) ‘You have no other choice you must 
go on.’ Unknown to the participants, the electric shocks were not real 
and the learner was an actor.7 As soon as the participants actually 
refused to continue or when they had used the 450 volt switch three 
times, the experiment was stopped.8
Before he actually conducted the experiment, Milgram believed 
that no one would reach 450 volts. Other experts he had asked predicted 
that: ‘virtually all subjects will refuse to obey the experimenter; only 
pathological fringe, not exceeding one or two percent, was expected 
to proceed to the end of the shock board.’9 To his own astonishment, 
Milgram discovered in his first two tries that most of his participants 
did go to the end. He realized he was onto something significant and 
began to wonder what he could make people do.10 As of that moment, 
Milgram deliberately tried ‘to create a context in which a majority of 
people would obey’.11 He put great effort into the setup of his experiment, 
the shock machine, the choice of the actors as well as the script.12 He 
thought carefully of a procedure to follow and took time to select the 
right people to assist in the experiment: a stern experimenter and the 
soft, kind learner impersonated by Jim Donough. When Milgram 
met him, he concluded that ‘this man would be perfect as victim. He 
7  The subjects in the experiment believed they were. See Perry, Behind the Shock Machine, p. 49; Russel, p. 154.
8  All participants were male with the exception of one variation in which possible differences between 
male and female participants were assessed: no differences between the sexes were found.
9  Milgram, Obedience to Authority, p. 31.
10  Russell, p. 146.
11  Jolanda Jetten and Frank Mols, ‘50:50 Hindsight: Appreciating anew the Contributions of Milgram’s 
Obedience Experiments’, Journal of Social Issues, 70.3 (2014), 587–602 (p. 589); Russell, p. 150.
12  Stephen D. Reicher and S. Alexander Haslam, ‘The Shock of the Old’, The Psychologist, 24.9 (2011), 
650–2 (p. 651).
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is mild and submissive, not at all academic.’13 They also rehearsed 
a lot.14 Perry went through Milgram’s notebooks and concluded: ‘the 
setup that he had created was carefully crafted to make it difficult for 
people to disobey.’15 Milgram, for instance, ‘increased the number of 
switches from twelve to thirty, making the increments smaller.’16 This, 
as we shall see in section 4.4, was likely to be one of the main rea-
sons why he obtained the results he did. He also had to make sure 
that the participants actually believed that the learner was receiving 
real shocks.17 The shock machine looked real and impressive. Milgram 
was determined to make his mark and show the world the tremendous 
power of a social situation in which participants would obey and 
follow the demands of an authority. 
All in all, Milgram conducted 40 versions and variations of his 
experiments, and the obedience rates varied enormously as an effect of 
the experimental variations. A total of 780 subjects participated 
in the experiments.18 The best-known variation and the one on which 
Milgram himself reported in his first publication is the so-called voice 
feedback in which 65% of the participants fully obeyed and gave the 
learner a shock of 450 volts.19 In a variation in which the subject had to 
push the hand of the learner onto a plate in order to make sure he would 
receive an electric shock, obedience dropped to 30%. In another variation, 
there were two rather than one experimenter and they disagreed, with 
one saying the experiment needs to continue and the other saying it 
needs to stop. In this case, all participants stopped. The main finding 
– and the figure that stood out – was, however, the 65% obedience rate.
Milgram had some trouble getting his first article on the experiments 
published but it eventually appeared in the Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology in 1963. In the article, Milgram drew a parallel with 
his experiments and the Holocaust and concluded that, probably, all of us 
could become perpetrators, and that the Holocaust could have happened 
anywhere: not because human beings were so evil but because they 
13  Perry, Behind the Shock Machine, p. 56.
14  Ibid., p. 57.
15  Ibid., p. 58.
16  Ibid., p. 50.
17  Ibid., p. 160.
18  Ibid., p. 6.
19  Stanley Milgram, ‘Behavioural Study of Obedience’, The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67.4 
(1963), 371–378.
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obeyed and could come to obey evil leaders. In order to support his 
point he wrote: 
I observed a mature and initially poised businessman enter the 
laboratory smiling and confident. Within 20 minutes he was reduced to 
a twitching, stuttering wreck, who was rapidly approaching a point of 
nervous collapse. He constantly pulled on his earlobe, and twisted his 
hands. At one point he pushed his fist into his forehead and muttered: 
‘Oh God, let’s stop it.’ And yet he continued to respond to every word of 
the experimenter, and obeyed to the end.20 
This passage shows why the experiment can be considered unethical, but 
it also shows the power of a social situation which can make individuals 
do things they would otherwise never do, namely give a fellow human 
being potentially lethal electric shocks. 
Maybe the most compelling piece of evidence from Milgram’s 
experiment is the film he made in which the struggle of several 
participants can be seen. The film is almost 45 minutes long. According 
to Perry, the aim of the film was to create: ‘a visual document aimed 
at disarming critics and establishing the universality and profundity 
of Milgram’s findings.’21 The film mainly focusses on the agonizing 
struggle of one of the subjects, Fred Prozi, who desperately wants to 
quit but nevertheless continues delivering the electric shocks up until 
the very end. Prozi is featured for a full 13 minutes, almost one third 
of the entire film. Milgram was very much aware of Prozi’s powerful 
‘performance’ and in his personal notes, called him ‘brilliant’ because 
of his ‘complete abdication and excellent tension’.22 
Milgram rightly concluded that people were not intrinsically sadistic, 
but that ‘something far more dangerous was revealed: the capacity for 
man to abandon his humanity, indeed, the inevitability that he does 
so, as he merges his unique personality into larger constitutional struc-
tures’.23 This was an important finding, even though his theory about 
his subjects being reduced to an ‘agentic state’ is generally considered 
unconvincing. In his book published many year later (1974), Milgram 
drew many parallels between his subjects and Eichmann, and between 
20  Milgram, 'Behavioural Study', p. 377.
21  Gina Perry, ‘Seeing Is Believing: The Role of the Film Obedience in Shaping Perceptions of Milgram’s Obedience 
to Authority Experiments’, Theory & Psychology, 25.5 (2015), 622–38. Perry herself is very critical of the film and 
calls it: ‘scientifically unconvincing, and an unreliable account of the Milgram’s research’ (p. 622).
22  Perry, Behind the Shock Machine, p. 284.
23  Milgram, Obedience to Authority, p. 188.
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these experiments and the Holocaust. Milgram’s experiment – just like 
Zimbardo’s Stanford prison experiment from 1971 – indeed seemed to 
show how easily people can be transformed from ordinary people into 
perpetrators. At the time, this was an innovative finding and ‘revealed 
truths about human nature that most people did not want to acknowledge 
– that the capacity for evil resided in everyone and waited only for the 
right circumstances to make its appearance.’24 This view countered the 
overriding view at the time that perpetrators were evil.25
One of the first to respond critically to Milgram’s research was 
Diana Baumrind in 1964. Her concerns related to the ethical dimensions 
of Milgram studies, and she was ‘appalled at his deception and 
psychologically abusive treatment of participants’.26 Baumrind argued 
that ‘Milgram’s subjects […] were trapped by a trusted individual into 
committing an act that he would consider unworthy’.27 Although the 
suffering of the subjects was real and genuine, the harsh critique was 
not always fair. Perlstadt concludes that: ‘Milgram operated within the 
ethical guidelines that existed in the early 1960s. In fact, he was one 
of the first to publish his debriefing procedures and attempted to 
document whether or not his subjects experienced harmful after-effects.’28 
Baumrind’s harsh criticism ‘sparked an intense debate about the ethics 
of research with human subjects’ and eventually led to establishing 
ethical guidelines which became institutionalized in 1973.29
Baumrind was, however, not the only one to be critical. Milgram 
was also severely criticized by a newspaper, the St Louis Post Dispatch, on 
2 November 1963, for conducting an experiment which was ‘nothing 
but open-eyed torture’.30 The next blow came when the National Science 
Fund decided not to fund further experiments by Milgram.31 When his 
temporary contract at Yale ended, Milgram was not offered a permanent 
position, probably because the criticism had damaged his reputation, 
24  Ludy T. Benjamin and Jeffrey A. Simpson, ‘The Power of the Situation: The Impact of Milgram’s Obedience 
Studies on Personality and Social Psychology’, American Psychologist, 64.1 (2009), 12–19 (p.12).
25  James Waller, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing, 2nd edn (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007).
26  Dianna Baumrind, ‘When Subjects Become Objects: The Lies behind the Milgram Legend’, Theory & Psychology, 
25.5 (2015), 690–696 (p. 691).
27  Baumrind, ‘Some Thoughts’, p. 422.
28  Harry Perlstadt, ‘Milgram’s Obedience to Authority: Its Origins, Controversies and Replications’, Theoretical 
& Applied Ethics, 2.2 (2013), 53–77 (p. 73).
29  Ibid., p. 236.
30  Ibid., p. 60.
31  Perry, ‘Seeing Is Believing’, p. 625.
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and he had to look for another job which he eventually found. Milgram 
stayed in academia, but his later research never garnered as much popu-
larity as his obedience experiments had. He died of cancer in 1984, aged 51.
Nevertheless, Milgram’s legacy has persisted and his studies have 
been successfully replicated, in some cases with minor variations or 
with a different approach.32 His findings were generally confirmed.33 
In what is arguably the most notable replication, Milgram’s obedience 
paradigm was used in the context of a French TV game show in 2010. This 
replication showed similar results to Milgram’s – thus showing that his 
findings are far from outdated.34
The Opening of the Archives: Shocking Revelations?
The opening of Yale’s archive many years after Milgram’s death made it 
possible for scholars to study the ‘Stanley Milgram Papers’, including all 
the notes and comments Milgram wrote down during the experiments, 
which had never been published before. These showed that Milgram 
himself had many doubts in the beginning but had pushed his doubts 
away. More troubling, however, is that the archives show, to use 
Nicholson’s words, that: ‘Milgram was not always forthcoming with 
the truth [...] and misrepresented several important facets of his research.’35 
Brannigan goes as far as to state that these new discoveries will 
‘fundamentally challenge the way scholars interpret Milgram and his 
experiments’.36 But is this really the case?
The first troubling issue that was identified after the opening of the 
archives is that participants were not debriefed in the way Milgram 
32  Thomas Blass, ‘From New Haven to Santa Clara: A Historical Perspective on the Milgram Obedience 
Experiments’, American Psychologists, 64.1 (2009), 37–45.
33  Blass; Jean-Léon Beauvois, Didier Courbet and Daniel Oberlé, ‘The Prescriptive Power of the Television 
Host: A Transposition of Milgram’s Obedience Paradigm to the Context of TV Game Show’, Revue 
Européene de Psychologie Appliquée, 62 (2012), 111–119 (p. 112), note that: ‘Milgram’s experiment was 
reproduced on more than 3000 persons, recruited from 12 different countries and every time, the same 
results were obtained’. See also Stephen Gibson, ‘Stanley Milgram’s Obedience Experiments’, in The 
Routledge International Handbook of Perpetrator Studies, ed. by Susanne C. Knittel & Zachary J. Goldberg 
(London: Routledge 2020), pp. 46–60 (p. 48).
34  David Chazan, ‘Row over “Torture” on French TV’, BBC News, 18 March 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/8573755.stm> [accessed 2 April 2020].
35  Ian Nicholson, ‘The Normalization of Torment: Producing and Managing Anguish in Milgram’s “Obedience” 
Laboratory’, Theory and Psychology, 25.5 (2015), 639–656 (p. 640).
36  Richard A. Griggs and George I. Whitehead III, ‘Coverage of Recent Criticism of Milgram’s Obedience 
Experiments in Introductory Social Psychology Textbooks’, Theory & Psychology, 25.5 (2015), 564–580 (p. 565).
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claimed. Perry concludes that Milgram failed to ‘dehoax’ ‘around 75 
percent of his 780 subjects; some would wait months to learn the 
truth, others, almost a year’.37 A former participant explains: ‘The 
experiment left such an effect on me that I spent the night in a cold 
sweat and nightmares because of the fear that I might have killed that 
man in the chair.’38 Another said he checked the death notices in the 
papers for at least two weeks to see if he had caused a man’s death.39 
These findings are troubling. It seems that the experiment was far more 
unethical than had been assumed so far. We can only guess the reasons 
why Milgram failed to dehoax the participants. Pragmatically, in order 
to test many people, it is possible that he ‘didn’t want word to spread 
in the New Haven community about the real purpose of his research’.40 
His ambition might also have played a part. In an interview with Perry, 
Blass states: ‘I think, really, he was driven by the need to make a mark 
for himself. I believe that his ambition made him overlook or minimize 
the suffering of some of his subjects.’41 
The opening of the archives also led to the discovery of a second 
problematic issue which casts doubts on Milgram’s methodological 
approach and consequently his findings. Analysis of the audio tapes 
makes it clear that the ‘experimenter didn’t always follow the controlled 
script for using the prods. He would parry participants’ protests, 
escalating the pressure by inventing coercive prods’.42 It even shows 
that the experimenter at times left the room, pretending he had a 
discussion with the learner.43 The experimenter’s behaviour led Perry 
to conclude that ‘the slavish obedience to authority we have come to 
associate with Milgram’s experiments begins to sound much more like 
bullying and coercion when you listen to the material’.44 From listening to 
the tapes, Perry concluded that the pressure in condition 20 was much 
higher than in the earlier experiments.45 The experimenter didn’t stop 
at the 4th prod. Perry quotes Russel: Williams used ‘progressively more 
coercive […] prods in trying to bring about what he sensed his boss 
37  Perry, Behind the Shock Machine, p. 14.
38  Ibid., p. 80.
39  Ibid.
40  Ibid., p. 78.
41  Ibid., p. 22.
42  Griggs and Whitehead, p. 566.
43  Alexander S. Haslam and Stephen D. Reicher, ‘50 Years of “Obedience to Authority”: From Blind Conformity 
to Engaged Followership’, Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 13 (2017), 58–78 (p. 63). 
44  Griggs and Whitehead, p. 566.
45  Perry, Behind the Shock Machine, p. 115.
A. Smeulers 9
desired.’46 Williams, the man who played the role of experimenter, kept 
track of the numbers of times he tried to convince a participant to 
continue. For one female participant this was 26 times.47 As Perry puts 
it, Williams seems to have taken ‘a much more active role – certainly 
in the later experiments, where he made it increasingly difficult for 
people to disobey.’48 This is clearly a troubling finding, as the prods 
were not standardized and there was more pressure on the subjects 
than Milgram had suggested. 
The third problematic issue is that more participants than originally 
thought did not fully believe the shocks were real or at least had some 
doubts. This is slightly at odds with the first issue mentioned above 
which precisely shows that many subjects did believe the shocks were 
real and suffered as a result. The point, however, is that not everyone seems 
to have believed this. Perry suggests that only half of his participants 
fully believed the shocks were real and only one third among them 
obeyed.49 Almost one quarter of the participants ‘had some doubts’ 
but nevertheless ‘believed the learner was probably getting shocked’.50 
Perry furthermore found that Milgram had asked one of his research 
assistants, Taketo Murata, to study the correlation between people who 
went to the end and those who believed the shocks were real. Murata 
found that ‘those who wrote that they fully believed the learner was 
receiving painful shocks gave lower levels of shock than those who said 
they thought that the learner was faking it’.51 ‘Milgram made a note on 
the bottom of Taketo’s analysis, arguing that the results couldn’t really 
be taken seriously because of course his subjects were more likely to say 
afterwards that they suspected or knew the experiment wasn’t real.’52 
This might be true but we will never know for sure. Murata’s analysis 
might also suggest that, as Perry concluded: ‘the majority of Milgram’s 
subjects resisted orders when they truly believed they might be hurting 
someone.’53 If true, this would indeed have a major impact on the 
46  Perry, Behind the Shock Machine, p. 115; see also Haslam and Reicher, ’50 Years’, p. 63.
47  Perry, Behind the Shock Machine, p. 116.
48  Ibid., 118; see also Haslam and Reicher, ’50 Years’, p. 63.
49  Perry, Behind the Shock Machine, pp. 139–140.
50  Ibid., p. 139.
51  Ibid., 140.
52  Ibid., p. 141.
53  Ibid., p. 141.
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outcome of Milgram’s conclusions.54 The findings from the archives 
disillusioned Perry: 
[it] made me question the results Milgram claimed to have found. It made 
me realize how much we have trusted Milgram as the narrator of his 
research and how important it is to question the stories we’ve been told.55 
The revelations are indeed troubling. Nevertheless, 56.1% of the subjects 
fully believed the shocks were real, and 24.0% thought they were 
probably real – this is still over 80%, as opposed to only 2.4% who 
were convinced the shocks were not real.56 If we took those who seri-
ously doubted whether the shocks were real out of the experiment, 
still almost half of the people went through with giving shocks. 
Furthermore, many replications of Milgram’s study have been conducted 
and these experiments show similar results.57 We can thus conclude 
that although the number and percentage of people following through 
might be lower than Milgram suggested, he still demonstrated that a large 
number of people (probably about half) will follow through with the 
experimenter’s demand. This is, in itself, a troubling and important finding.
In addition to the ethical issues (briefly discussed above) Milgram 
is criticized along two main lines which contradict each other. Some 
critics claim that his experiments are not about obedience at all, while 
others assert that his findings cannot explain mass atrocities because 
these atrocities were not committed out of obedience. These points of 
criticism will be discussed in sections 4 and 5 respectively.
Is Milgram’s Experiment about Obedience?
Milgram himself believed that he had shown the power of obedience. 
The film made of the experiment was called Obedience and the full report 
on the experiment was published in 1974 in a book called Obedience to 
Authority. Some scholars, however, doubt whether Milgram’s experiments 
were about obedience at all.58 The strongest argument raised is that the 
54  See also Griggs and Whitehead, p. 572.
55  Perry, Behind the Shock Machine , p. 12.
56  Ibid., p. 139.
57  See Blass; Beauvois and others.
58  See Nestar J.C. Russell and Robert J. Gregory, ‘Spinning an Organizational “Web of Obligations”? In Stanley 
Milgram’s “Obedience” Experiments’, American Review of Public Administration, 41.5 (2011), 495–518 (p. 497); 
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fourth prod (‘You have no choice, you must continue’) is the only clear 
order but also the least likely prod to be followed.59 In his replication 
of Milgram’s experiment, Burger realized ‘that not a single participant 
continued after receiving prod 4’.60 Some critics even suggest that this 
proves that people are inclined to disobey rather than obey.61 But is that 
indeed true? In deciding on this we must take into account, as Staub 
notes, that the fourth prod was only used when the subjects already 
seriously doubted whether they should continue.62 In fact, the style of 
the fourth prod actually requested obedience in a way that was, 
according to Staub ‘rather absurd and resistance-generating’.63 So if it 
wasn’t about obedience, what could Milgram’s experiment have been 
about? In the following subsection this question and the alternative 
explanations provided will be discussed.
Wanting to Do the Right Thing
Some scholars suggest that participants did not just follow orders but 
wanted to ‘do the right thing’; wanted to do as was expected of them.64 
Others, and this would seem to support the same argument, stress 
that it has to do with misplaced trust.65 Some scholars argue that the 
participants continued out of politeness, because they didn’t want to 
S. Alexander Haslam and others, ‘Happy to Have Been of Service’: The Yale Archives as a Window into the 
Engaged Followership of Participants in Milgram’s ‘Obedience’ Experiments, British Journal of Social Psychology, 
54.1 (2014), 55–83; Haslam and Reicher, ‘50 Years; Gibson, ‘Stanley Milgram’s Obedience Experiments’, p. 56.
59  Alexandra Craven and Jonathan Potter have insightfully distinguished between different types of directives. 
Directives are ‘utterances designed to get someone to do something’ but they can be formulated as a 
direct order, a request but also into more indirect forms or requests. This is all related to the entitlement of 
people making the requests and their orientation towards the ‘contingencies on which the compliance with 
the directive may rest’. Alexandra Craven and Jonathan Potter, ‘Directives: Entitlement and Contingency in 
Action’, Discourse Studies, 12.4 (2010), 419–442 (p. 426). See also Jerry M. Burger, ‘Replicating Milgram: Would 
People Still Obey Today?’, American Psychologist, 64.1 (2009), 1–11; Jerry M. Burger, ‘Situational Features in 
Milgram’s Experiment that Kept his Participants Shocking’, Journal of Social Issues, 70.3 (2014), 489–500; 
Reicher and others, ‘What Makes a Person a Perpetrator?’, p. 399.
60  Griggs and Whitehead, p. 567.
61  Ibid., p. 567.
62  Ervin Staub, ‘Obeying, Joining, Following, Resisting, and other Processes in the Milgram Studies and in the 
Holocaust, and Other Genocides: Situations, Personality and Bystanders’, Journal of Social Issues, 70.3 
(2014), 501–514 (p. 506).
63  Ibid.
64  Milgram, Obedience to Authority, pp. 159–160; Staub, ‘Obeying, Joining’, p. 506; S.Alexander Haslam and 
Stephen D. Reicher, ‘Contesting the “Nature” of Conformity: What Milgram and Zimbardo’s Studies Really 
Show’, PLoS Biology, 10.11 (2012) <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3502509> [accessed 2 
April 2020]; Jetten and Mols, p. 591.
65  Perry, Behind the Shock Machine, p. 60.
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break the agreement they entered.66 Others suggest that social identity 
theory provides an answer, whereby the subjects feel they share a social 
identity with the experimenter, a sense of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, or they did 
not want to go against the experimenter because it would make them 
feel awkward.67 Others suggested that the subjects were motivated by 
an appeal to science.68 All these points are valid, but the experiment 
also shows that as soon as participants were faced with a moral 
dilemma, many of them relied on the experimenter, a man in a position 
of authority, to decide what the right thing to do was. They placed their 
trust in his judgment. This shows, therefore, that it may not be (blind) 
obedience per se (just do as one is told) that made the participants 
comply. Rather, it is a form of submission or subordination, a phenomenon 
which Haslam and Reicher called ‘engaged followership’: ‘people are 
prepared to harm others because they identify with their leaders’ cause 
and believe their actions to be virtuous.’69 This indeed seems to have 
been the case. The participants were stuck in a situation in which they 
let the experimenter decide for them: they thus conformed to his 
authority out of respect for his knowledge and followed his requests. 
Milgram himself concluded: ‘There is a propensity for people to accept 
definitions of action provided by a legitimate authority. That is, although 
the subject performs the action, he allows authority to define its meaning.’70 
In other words, authority figures can turn something bad (giving a fellow 
human being electric shocks) into something good (contributing to 
science).71 What this shows is that the participants did not blindly obey 
orders, but they let the experimenter define the situation by trusting 
him (the shocks may be painful but are not dangerous) rather than 
relying on their own knowledge (electric shocks are dangerous). 
66  Staub, ‘Obeying, Joining’, p. 506.
67  E.g., Russel and Gregory, p. 500.
68  S. Alexander Haslam, Stephen D. Reicher and Megan E. Birney, ‘Nothing by Mere Authority: Evidence that 
in an Experimental Analogue of the Milgram Paradigm Participants are Motivated Not by Others but by 
Appeals to Science’, Journal of Social Issues, 70.3 (2014), 473–488.
69  Haslam and Reicher, ‘50 Years’, p. 59.
70  Milgram, Obedience to Authority, p. 145.
71  See Nestar Russell, ‘The Emergence of Milgram’s Bureaucratic Machine’, Journal of Social Issues, 70.3 
(2014), 409–423 (p. 410).
A. Smeulers 13
Difficult New Task and Little Time to Think 
According to Burger, the task given to the subjects in the Milgram 
experiment was more difficult than both Milgram and the participants 
had anticipated, and the combination of the novel situation and the urge 
to move on at a certain speed gave participants little time to think.72 
Perry compared the experience with: ‘stepping onto a fast-moving 
escalator.’73 One of the participants seemed to confirm this by stating: ‘I 
thought, I’m just going to go along with this thing. I don’t know what’s 
going on but let’s get it over with.’74 When a situation is new, people 
look at others for clues on how to behave. The other, in this case, was the 
experimenter. Burger notes that: ‘The experimenter’s influence came 
not from his position of authority, but because of his expertise.’75 The 
point is that a position of authority is indeed not necessarily based on 
(formal) hierarchies but can also be based on (alleged) knowledge and 
expertise. In this case, the experimenter was assumed to be knowledgeable, 
an expert, and this made him into an authority.76
Organizational Setting and Diffusion of Responsibility
Some scholars suggest that the organizational setting in which the 
participants were placed played a role. Russel and Gregory for instance 
argue that: ‘Milgram’s experiments have less to do with obedience to 
authority per se and more to do with how people resolve moral 
dilemmas confronting them in a structured organizational setting.’77 
This is indeed true: we are social beings and human conduct is primarily 
social in nature.78 The difference between obedience and deviance 
72  Jerry.M. Burger, ‘Alive and Well after All These Years’, The Psychologist, 24.9 (2011), 654–657. 
73  Perry, Behind the Shock Machine, p. 42.
74  Ibid., p. 45.
75  Burger, ‘Situational Features’, p. 494.
76  In her discussion of the Milgram experiment, Perlstadt refers to an experiment in which school chil-
dren had to assess the length of lines. Up to 89% of the school children changed their correct answer 
into a wrong answer after the experimenter, who was assumed to be very knowledgeable, asked: ‘are 
you sure? Is it not the next line?’ This clearly shows how susceptible children are to the influence of 
others especially if they are knowledgeable and thus in a position of authority (or vice versa). The 
same is likely to be true for adults. Perlstadt, p. 57.
77  Russel and Gregory, p. 495.
78  See Elliot Aronson, The Social Animal (New York: Worth Publishers, 2004); Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity 
and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), p. 156.
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is often the outcome of social interaction.79 This is confirmed by the 
findings of Hollander, who analysed the transcripts of 117 sessions and 
found that the conversations often seemed like negotiations.80 When 
confronted with unfamiliar situations or moral dilemmas, we often 
look at others for clues on how to behave. Human beings are driven 
by the desire to do the right thing, make sense of their lives, and to 
belong.81 A practical application of this is illustrated by Darley’s and 
Latané’s research on bystanders. They point to the so-called bystander 
effect, whereby the more people witness an emergency, the less likely they 
are to intervene. This is the case because people look at others to find 
clues on how to behave.82 In emergency situations, people would look 
at other bystanders. In organizational settings, however, it seems natural 
to find clues on how to behave by looking at ‘the man in charge’. 
The additional advantage of looking at the person in charge is that 
this person also has a certain level of responsibility. The Milgram 
experiment showed that participants were bothered about their role 
and responsibility but felt relieved when the experimenter, the man in 
a position of authority, accepted full responsibility. 
As we know from wider research, feeling a lack of responsibility leads 
to moral disengagement which makes it easier to hurt others.83 Burger 
found evidence that those who expressed a sense of responsibility stopped 
at some point while others who didn’t do so, continued.84 The prods 
played an important role in the diffusion of responsibility.85 Burger 
noted: ‘Milgram created a situation in which his participants could 
easily deny or diffuse responsibility for hurting the learner.’86 Burger 
did further research and concluded: 
79  Andre Modigliani and Francois Rochat, ‘The Role of Interaction Sequences and the Timing of 
Resistance in Shaping Obedience and Defiance to Authority’, Journal of Social Issues, 51.3 (1995), 107–
123. See also Mathew M. Hollander, ‘The Repertoire of Resistance: Non-compliance with Directives in 
Milgram’s ‘Obedience’ Experiments’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 54.3 (2015), 425–444. 
80  Ibid.; Gibson, ‘Stanley Milgram’s Obedience Experiments’. According to Gibson, rhetoric also played a role: 
‘Obedience without Orders: Expanding Social Psychology’s Conception of ‘Obedience’, British Journal of 
Social Psychology, 58.1 (2019), 241–257 (p. 247).
81  See Aronson; Haslam and Reicher, ‘50 Years’; Asch.
82  John M. Darley and Bibb Latané, ‘Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility’, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8.4 (1968), 377–382.
83  Albert Bandura, ‘Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities’, Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 3.3 (1999), 193–209. 
84  Burger, ‘Alive and Well’, p. 656.
85  Haslam, Reicher and Birney.
86  Burger, ‘Situational Features’, p. 495.
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Among those who had followed the instructions to the end, only 12,2% 
gave any indication that they felt some responsibility for the learner’s fate. 
In contrast, 66,7% of those who had ended the procedure early expressed 
a sense of personal responsibility for what was happening to the learner.87
This seems to indicate that being able to divert responsibility makes it 
easier to comply with requests to hurt a fellow human being. The ex-
periment thus seemed to show that an authority figure almost naturally 
takes responsibility, and submissive subjects conveniently let them do so.
Small Increments and the Psychological Trap
Several scholars have argued that the way the procedure was set up, 
and especially the sequential nature of action, played a crucial role in 
the outcome of the experiment. The participant had to start with an 
acceptable moderate electric shock of 15 volts. With each mistake, the 
level of the shock was increased by 15 volts up to the totally unacceptable 
450 volts. The crucial question, however, is: Where is the borderline? 
At what point does the shock level become unacceptable? Once the 
experiment started, the participants may have found it hard to realize 
what was going on and to take a clear stand by refusing to continue 
with the experiment. This was mainly due to the fact that the situation 
carried its own momentum. Russel and Gregory conclude that ‘Milgram 
built an inherently bureaucratic structure – a “terrible machine” which 
gradually urged, pushed, prodded, then manipulated, lured and 
eventually tempted most participants into choosing harm to an innocent 
person’.88 They furthermore state that: ‘by the time these participants 
realized that they could not exit without a confrontation with the 
experimenter, they were at least half-way along the switchboard.’89 
Burger concludes: ‘because of consistency needs and self-perception 
processes, each lever press made it easier for participants to press the 
next lever.’90 This process can be compared with the foot-in-the-door-
technique (once people comply with a small request they are more 
likely to comply to a large request) and the continuum of destructive-
ness as developed by Staub in which people learn by doing: each step 
87  Ibid., p. 496. In a later replication of Milgram within the French TV show The Game of Death, researchers 
found similar results: ‘obedient subjects attributed more responsibility to the producer than to 
themselves, whereas disobedient subjects did just the opposite’: Beauvois and others, p. 116.
88  Russel and Gregory, p. 502.
89  Ibid., p. 509; see also Bauman, p. 157.
90  Burger, ‘Situational Features’, p. 492.
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in the continuum of destructiveness makes the following step possible, 
even likely.91 
Milgram himself was very much aware of the powerful force of the 
built-in sequential nature of the action and the psychological trap it 
entails: ‘For if he breaks off, he must say to himself: “everything I have 
done to this point is bad, and I now acknowledge it by breaking off.”’92 
Erdos agrees and explains why this can be seen as a psychological trap 
which spurs people to go on: 
If subjects quit at any point up the line, they demonstrate that they 
could have disobeyed all along. They are trapped into obeying to 
the end if they are to deflect blame to the authority and persuade 
themselves that they are not responsible since they were following 
orders and little control over the process.93 
Erdos consequently asserts that ‘far from capturing the essence of 
obedience’ the experiment highlighted the trap of self-deception. 
He concludes: ‘This behaviour is fuelled more by inner than by outer 
forces. The influence of authority may have initiated it, but from then 
on it is significantly self-propelled.’94 I fully agree. What likely played 
a role here is that the pressure to obey gets even stronger if arranged 
as an escalating commitment. The authority figure does play a crucial 
role in providing the participant with an excuse that is acceptable from his 
point of view at the beginning, and then in gradually pushing him to the end.
Not Blind Obedience
It was not blind obedience that Milgram measured or showed to exist 
but rather the tendency to go along with the experimenter because he 
was an authority figure in this particular context. Participants accepted 
the social definition of the situation as provided by the experimenter, 
precisely because he was in a position of authority and was supposed 
to know more than they did. The participants trusted the experimenter. 
We can thus conclude that the Milgram experiment is not about blind 
and unquestioning obedience to any order that is given, but that it 
rather shows how people in an authoritative position can make others 
91  Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989); Russel and Gregory, p. 502.
92  Milgram, Obedience to Authority, p. 149.
93  Edward Erdos, ‘The Milgram Trap’, Theoretical & Applied Ethics, 2.2 (2013), 123–142 (p. 125). 
94  Ibid., p. 140.
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do things they would otherwise not do. It is, in this sense, about ‘the 
relationship of authority and subordination’ as Bauman has already 
suggested.95 It is not so much our response to orders but our response to 
authority that matters.96 In line with this reasoning, Gibson concludes 
that we should redefine obedience as ‘submission to the requirements 
of authority’97 because there are ‘more subtle ways in which authority 
operates, and in which obedience is enacted’.98 We need to understand 
obedience in a ‘complex socio-institutional context’.99 In those situations, 
‘direct orders are not necessary for obedience, all that is needed is for the 
system to do its job – to persuade people that a certain thing needs to 
be done, and that they are the ones that need to do it.’100
We trust authority figures because we rely on their knowledge and 
expertise, accept the definition of a situation as they provide it to us, 
and let ourselves be commanded by them, giving them full responsibility 
for our behaviour. We do so because we are raised to trust and follow 
authority figures and thus believe it is the right thing to do.101 Disobeying 
an authority figure seems awkward and makes us feel we are doing 
the wrong thing. Besides, it is easy to just follow others in situations 
in which we do not know what to do or in which (as was the case in 
Milgram’s experiment) we are faced with a moral dilemma. If such an 
authority uses the power they have over others in such a way as to not 
confront them immediately with unacceptable demands (give someone a 
shock at the 450 volt level straightaway), that is, if the requests are more 
gradual, people will get caught up in a psychological trap. By using 
this gradual progression, people can end up following an authority up to 
the point at which they accept the unacceptable. In conclusion: Milgram’s 
experiments are not about (blind) obedience per se but about how 
authorities can come to influence our behaviour by instilling a ‘sense 
95  Bauman, p. 153.
96  Ibid., p. 162.
97  Gibson, ‘Stanley Milgram’s Obedience Experiments’, p. 56.
98  Gibson, ‘Obedience without Orders’, p. 246.
99  Gibson states that ‘authority is built into the fabric of social relations in such a way that it no longer 
needs to be executed overtly, but rather so that people regulate themselves. […] In Milgram’s 
experiment, it is not simply the experimenter who constitutes the authority, but the wider system he 
inhabits, and of which he is a part’. Ibid., p. 253.
100  Ibid., p. 255.
101  Roy F. Baumeister, Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1997), 
p. 266; Arthur G. Miller, ‘The Explanatory Value of Milgram’s Obedience Experiments: A Contemporary 
Appraisal’, Journal of Social Issues, 70.3 (2014), 558–573. 
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of obligation’ as Milgram himself concluded.102 This is acknowledged in 
the concept of ‘crimes of obedience’ as defined by Kelman and Hamilton.103 
A crime of obedience can be defined as ‘an act performed in response 
to orders from authority that is considered illegal or immoral by the 
international community’.104 Kelman and Hamilton also point out that 
subordinates do not need a direct order but often behave as they think 
is ‘expected of them by their superiors’.105 Milgram showed that there is 
a difference between blind obedience to direct orders and other variations 
of obedience which come down to conformity to an authority’s requests.
 Can Milgram’s Findings Explain the Holocaust?
Milgram himself clearly believed that his experiments helped explain 
the Holocaust, and many scholars agree, including Arendt, Hilberg, 
Lifton, Kelman and Hamilton, Staub, Browning and Zimbardo, 
although they often add that other factors played a role too.106 Other 
scholars are very critical, warn against drawing parallels or even 
conclude that ‘Milgram’s research has little, if anything, to say about 
the behaviour of the perpetrators of the Holocaust.’107 But is that really 
the case? In this section I will go over these critics’ principal arguments 
and discuss whether any have merit.
More Complex: Obedience Just One Factor
An argument many scholars put forward is that the Holocaust is far 
more complex than Milgram’s experiment. Burger for instance notes: 
‘There is no logical reason why an explanation for a psychology experiment 
102  Milgram, Obedience to Authority, p. 6. See also Ian Kershaw, ‘Working Towards the Führer’: Reflections 
on the Nature of the Hitler Dictatorship, ed. by Christian Leitz (London: Blackwell, 1999), p. 243.
103  Herbert C. Kelman and V. Lee Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 46.
104  Ibid., p. 46. 
105  Kelman and Hamilton, p. 46.
106  Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (London: Penguin Books 1964); Robert J. 
Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 1988); Kelman 
and Hamilton; Staub, The Roots of Evil and ‘Obeying, Joining’, p. 50; Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: 
Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: Aaron Asher Books, 1992); Zimbardo.
107  Allan Fenigstein, ‘Milgram’s Shock Experiments and the Nazi Perpetrators: A Contrarian Perspective on 
the Role of Obedience Pressures during the Holocaust’, Theory & Psychology, 25.5 (2015), 581–598. See 
also Augustine Brannigan, Ian Nicholson and Frances Cherry, ‘Introduction to the Special Issue: Unplugging 
the Milgram Machine’, Theory & Psychology, 25.5 (2015), 551–563; Burger, ‘Situational Features’; Nicholson.
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must also account for a complex phenomenon like the Holocaust.’108 
Mastroianni concludes: ‘the idea that any of us could be transformed 
into genocidaires in a few hours in a social psychology laboratory is 
wrong.’109 Undoubtedly, the Holocaust is far more complex and it cannot be 
explained by mere obedience. I would nevertheless argue that Milgram’s 
findings have not lost all merit. As already indicated above, much 
depends on how obedience is defined. If obedience is restrictively 
defined as ‘following direct orders’ (i.e. blind obedience), which suggests 
that the perpetrators were mere passive automatons, then this indeed 
does not help us any further in explaining the Holocaust.110 In my view, 
however, we should define obedience more broadly as subordination 
to an authority. 
Milgram showed us how strong our natural tendency to follow 
an authority is, even when confronted with unethical demands which 
we do not like.111 He showed us how difficult it is to go against an 
authority and how we can get caught up in a procedure or process.112 To 
this extent, his findings remain crucial in understanding mass atroc-
ities and we can give him credit for making us aware of one of the 
most important explanatory factors in an otherwise very complex 
situation.113 These findings are, however, just one piece of the puzzle, 
and I would like to stress that Milgram never suggested otherwise.
Little Pressure to Obey during Holocaust
Another argument often used is that during the Holocaust, obedience 
did not play an important role because there was very little pressure 
to obey.114 Some scholars note that the assumption that SS men who 
disobeyed orders were severely punished or killed is largely mistaken: 
‘it was merely a matter of shame and disgrace for not measuring up the 
Nazi ideal.’115 This does not, though, mean that there was little pres-
sure to obey. Firstly, although it might be true that, as Lewy suggests, 
108  Burger, ‘Situational Features’, p. 498.
109  George R. Mastroianni, ‘Obedience in Perspective: Psychology and the Holocaust’, Theory and Psychology, 
25.5 (2015), 657–669 (p. 668). See also Erdos, p. 137.
110  See also Staub, ‘Obeying, Joining’, p. 502.
111  Fred Prozi, the subject prominently featured in the documentary, is the best illustration of this.
112  Staub, The Roots of Evil ; Kelman and Hamilton; Bauman; Baumeister; Guenter Lewy, Perpetrators: The 
World of the Holocaust Killers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
113  Perry, Behind the Shock Machine , p. 280.
114  Fenigstein, pp. 581–585.
115  Ibid., p. 593.
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no SS officer was shot for disobeying an order to exterminate Jews, this 
does not mean that SS officers didn’t believe that this was a serious possi-
bility at the time.116 Besides, other punishments or demotions were a 
real possibility. Lewy, for instance, refers to the case of Klaus Hornig 
who refused to obey an order because, in his view, the order (to shoot 
Jews) violated international law as well as German law. Hornig was 
then charged with ‘undermining morale because he had told his men 
of the illegality of shooting prisoners of war’ and was sentenced to two 
and a half years imprisonment.117 This shows that there was a threat and 
people were punished for disobedience. Secondly, there was the social 
pressure to follow the commands of the authority. The sense of obligation 
and general duty to obey a higher-ranking officer, the pressure to 
defend one’s country and to follow the leader, all put huge pressure on 
the lower ranking recruits to obey orders. Furthermore, SS soldiers 
had to give Hitler an oath in which they promised their loyalty. This 
oath by itself strongly inclined them to obey. In addition to the pressure 
of a possible punishment, the social and emotional pressure of not 
being a disgrace to either oneself (for violating the oath) or others (for 
‘being a coward’) was tremendous.118 
Some critics argue that because there was little pressure (which 
I disagree with), there was room for choice (which I partially agree 
with) and hence the behaviour should be attributed to other causes.119 
However, the existence of other additional reasons to comply with 
authority does not mean that obedience, understood as the tendency to 
follow an authority figure, no longer played a role. Most scholars agree 
that obedience played an important role and that, as Lewy noted, the 
‘largest group participated because they had been ordered to do so’ and 
wanted to do the right thing.120 ‘The right thing’ was perceived as 
following the demands of an authority and going along with state policy. 
The genocide was not the result of spontaneous hate attacks (some of 
the early purges were) but was a well organized policy authorized 
by the state. Without the state, far fewer people would have gotten 
involved in the genocide. This shows that there was a strong pressure 
to go along with what people in a position of authority demanded, and 
that these people decided on the course of the events.
116  Lewy, p. 44. See also Baumeister, p. 323.
117  Lewy, p. 80.
118  See also Browning, p. 72. 
119  See also Lewy, p. 45.
120  Ibid., p. 50.
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Absent Moral Conflict and Willing Participants 
A number of scholars argue that the moral conflict which is so visible 
within Milgram’s participants was absent within the Holocaust.121 The 
fact that moral conflict is not clearly visible, however, doesn’t mean 
it is not there. Research on perpetrators has consistently shown that 
most perpetrators find it hard to deal with their emotions at first, but 
then get accustomed to what they are doing and start justifying and 
rationalizing their behaviour.122 Kelman and Hamilton call this 
‘routinization’ and Staub calls this phenomenon the ‘continuum of 
destructiveness’.123 Testimonies by perpetrators confirm the existence 
of these mechanisms and show that they gradually get used to carrying 
out extreme violence.124 The crux here is that people change by doing.125 
Even fierce critics of Milgram acknowledge that perpetrators, such 
as the members of RPB 101, who were studied by Browning and 
Goldhagen, showed disgust but then qualified it as ‘sheer physical 
revulsion’. They suggest that there was no ‘ethical principle behind the 
revulsion’.126 Yet the origin of the disgust is contested and may remain at 
the level of speculation, since the true source of ‘animal pity’ as Arendt 
called it, can be both: sheer physical revulsion or moral disgust.127 But 
whatever the actual source of the disgust, it is acknowledged that many 
soldiers as well as perpetrators gradually morally disengage as they get 
used to what they are doing, becomeing brutalized. 128 It is also known 
that at least some perpetrators suffer from nervous breakdowns, 
121  Nicholson, p. 639; Fenigstein, pp. 588–590.
122  Andrés Valenzuela Morales and Mónica González, ‘Confessions of a State Terrorist’, Harper’s, June 
1985, <https://harpers.org/archive/1985/06/confessions-of-a-state-terrorist> [accessed 2 April 2020]; 
Lifton; Kelman and Hamilton; Alette Smeulers, ‘Auschwitz and the Holocaust through the Eyes of the 
Perpetrators’, Driemaandelijks Tijdschrift van de Stichting Auschwitz, 50 (1996), 23–55; Alette Smeulers, 
‘What Transforms Ordinary People into Gross Human Rights Violations?’, in Understanding Human Rights 
Violations: New Systematic Studies, ed. by Sabine C. Carey and Steven C. Poe (Farnham, UK: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2004), pp. 239–256; Ditta M. Munch-Jurisic, ‘Perpetrator Abhorrence: Disgust as a Stop Sign’, 
Metaphilosophy, 45.2 (2014), 270–287; Staub, The Roots of Evil; Browning; Foster and others 2005.
123  Kelman and Hamilton; Staub, The Roots of Evil; see also Smeulers, ‘Auschwitz and the Holocaust’; ‘What 
Transforms’.
124  Valenzuela Morales and González; Rudolf Hoess, Commandant of Auschwitz: The Autobiography of Rudolf 
Hoess (New York: World, 1959); Don Foster, Paul Haupt and Maresa De Beer, The Theatre of Violence: 
Narratives of Protagonists in the South African Conflict (Cape Town: Institute of Justice and Reconciliation, 2005).
125  See Staub, The Roots of Evil; Smeulers, ‘What Transforms’; Zimbardo.
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nightmares and PTSD after the facts.129 Perpetrators’ trauma, however, 
is not something easily accepted or talked about.130 
Several scholars state that Nazi perpetrators believed that the killing 
was just and legitimate.131 Perpetrators have many different motives for 
committing mass atrocities amongst which are fear, greed and also 
ideology.132 A distinction needs to be made, however, between those 
who were convinced by a certain ideology and were keen followers of a 
man like Hitler, and those who were less enthusiastic but drawn into the 
violence (for instance, by following orders) and who started to embrace 
the existing ideology in order to rationalize and justify their own 
behaviour.133 Human beings have a natural tendency to rationalize 
their own actions and to ‘convince themselves (and others) that it [their 
behaviour] was a logical, reasonable thing to do’.134 This is generally 
true but even more so when people do something wrong, when they 
commit a crime and certainly when they harm or kill a fellow human 
being. Trying to rationalize and justify our behaviour (often after the 
facts) is an attempt to soothe our conscience and to reduce cognitive 
dissonance.135 Holding on to a belief or embracing an ideology can 
offer a means to cope and in extreme cases, to psychologically survive.136 
Within a genocidal regime like Nazi Germany, the whole state apparatus, 
the propaganda machine, the ideology, all were meant to make people 
believe that the genocide was an acceptable means to further German 
interests and to work for a better future.
129  See also the compelling evidence of this in the documentary Four hours in My Lai, dir. by Kevin Sim (ITV, 
1989). Here, Vernado Simpson is a heavily traumatized Vietnam veteran who took part in the My Lai 
massacre. Smeulers ‘What Transforms’; Janice T. Gibson and Mika Haritos-Fatouros, ‘The Education of 
a Torturer’, Psychology Today, 20.11 (1986), 56–58 (p. 58); Mika Haritos- Fatouros, The Psychological Origins 
of Institutionalized Torture (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 62; Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth: A 
Negro Psychoanalyst’s Study of the Problems of Racism & Colonialism in the World Today (New York: Grove 
Press, 1963), p. 268; Foster and others.
130  Saira Mohamed, ‘Of Monsters and Men: Perpetrator Trauma and Mass Atrocity’, Columbia Law Review, 
115.5 (2015), 1157–1216.
131  See, e.g., Fenigstein.
132  For typologies see Ronald D. Crelinsten, ‘The World of Torture: A Constructed Reality’, Theoretical 
Criminology, 7.3 (2003), 293–318; Manfred Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Alette Smeulers, ‘Perpetrators of International Crimes: 
Towards a Typology’, in Supranational Criminology, ed. by Alette Smeulers & Roelof Haveman (Antwerp: 
Intersenia 2008), pp. 233–265.
133  Smeulers, ‘What Transforms’.
134  Aronson, p. 144.
135  Leon Festinger, A Theory on Cognitive Dissonance (Evanson: Row Peterson, 1957). 
136  Daniel Goleman dubs this reaction appropriately as ‘vital lies’. See Daniel Goleman, Vital Lies, Simple 
Truths: The Psychology of Self-Deception (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985).
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Goldhagen suggests that Nazi Germany was a very anti-Semitic 
country before the Holocaust, but Lewy concludes that: ‘prior to 1933, 
the Germans arguably were among the least anti-Semitic people in 
Europe, though hostility to the Jews has existed for centuries.’137 
Although some perpetrators were motivated by antisemitism, the fact 
that the extermination of Jews became state policy legitimized the 
killings.138 Here the role of subordination to an authority is crucial. The 
willingness of the perpetrators to participate at a certain time does not 
prove that moral conflict has never been there, nor that they have been 
willing participants all along. 
Tricked 
Another argument used to criticise Milgram’s experiment as having 
little value is that the subjects were tricked into believing they were 
contributing to science. Brannigan et al., for instance, note: ‘What all 
of this testimony makes clear is that Milgram’s research was a world 
away from the “real life” scenarios of unlawful killing that he claimed 
to be investigating.’139 Brannigan et al. further note: ‘Nazi killers were 
not working in the context of benign expectations associated with a 
“psychological experiment” […]. [They] knew exactly what they were 
doing and many were glad to participate.’140 Of course giving electric 
shocks in a laboratory environment in an experiment which didn’t last 
long is a world away from a well-planned, well organized genocidal 
campaign which lasted several years and killed millions. The parallel 
mechanisms are however equally striking. First of all, the subjects in 
the Milgram experiment – at least in most variations – clearly heard 
the screams of the agonized learner and thus couldn’t deny the pain 
he was in either. But even without hearing the screams it should have 
been clear to all subjects that the shocks were painful: it is common 
knowledge that electricity can be lethal. Besides, replications in which 
the subjects were clear about the damaging nature of their involvement 
showed that obedience did not drop, quite the contrary.141 Secondly, in 
137  Daniel J. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1996); Lewy, p. 124.
138  Ibid., p. 126.
139  Brannigan and others, p. 556.
140  Ibid., p. 556. In a similar vein, see Nicholson, p. 653.
141  Wim H.J. Meeus and Quiten A.W. Raaijmakers, ‘Administrative Obedience: Carrying out Orders to use 
Psychological Administrative Violence’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 16.4 (1986), 311–324.
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the Milgram experiment the pain caused was justified by referring to 
the overriding higher goal (i.e. science). The parallel to Nazi Germany 
is once again striking: here too the killing itself wasn’t seen as something 
glorious or even a goal in itself but rather as something which had to 
be done in order to achieve a higher and benign goal, namely to create 
a better world. Here too the killing was instrumental, or, to use 
Baumann’s words: destruction as a means of creation.142 
The key question according to Nicholson is: ‘How does it become 
‘normal’ and ‘ok’ to torture or kill defenceless people?’143 But here again 
Milgram himself provided the answer and should be given more credit. He 
showed how an authority can make us believe that what we are doing 
is okay and the right thing to do even if we hurt or kill others. Just as 
the experimenter in the Milgram experiment could make the subjects 
believe that the shocks were fine (despite everyone knowing that they 
are not), the Nazi leaders made many Germans believe that the Jews 
were to blame for all the misfortunes of the Germans after WWI and 
that in order to protect themselves and create a better world, they needed 
to get rid of them. The overarching goal (to create a better world) is 
used as a means to justify otherwise totally unacceptable behaviour. 
Once the end justifies the means, morality is reversed and harming or 
killing can be presented as a necessary means to achieve something 
important. This is illustrated by the infamous speech given in October 
1943 by Himmler to officers commanding the infamous Einsatzgruppen, 
which killed many Jews:
Most of you know what it means when 100 corpses lie there, or 500 lie 
there, or 1000 lie there. To have gone through this and – apart from the 
exceptions caused by human weakness – to have remained decent, that 
has hardened us. That is a page of glory in our history never written and 
never to be written.144
Again, I would argue that the parallel to Milgram, in which the subjects 
gave painful and potentially lethal shocks to a fellow human being in 
order to further science, is clear and very evident.
142  Bauman, p. 92.
143  Nicholson.
144  The original text was in German and reads as follows: ‘Von allen, die so reden, hat keiner zugesehen, 
keiner hat es durchgestanden. Von Euch werden die meisten wissen, was es heißt, wenn 100 Leichen 
beisammen liegen, wenn 500 daliegen oder wenn 1000 daliegen. Dies durchgehalten zu haben, und 
dabei - abgesehen von Ausnahmen menschlicher Schwächen – anständig geblieben zu sein, das hat 
uns hart gemacht. Dies ist ein niemals geschriebenes und niemals zu schreibendes Ruhmesblatt 
unserer Geschichte.' Qtd. in Herbert Jäger, Makrokriminalität (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1962), p. 82. 
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Conclusion
In conclusion, it can be said that the outcome of Milgram’s experiment 
should be used with more care than was the case before the files were 
opened. Obedience rates are slightly lower than as presented by Milgram. 
Nevertheless, these rates are still high. Perry, despite being disillu-
sioned by Milgram, ascertains after analysing all data that: ‘43,6% of 
Milgram’s participants went to maximum voltage.’145 This remains 
a significant number. Secondly, we can conclude that Milgram’s 
experiments are not about blind obedience but rather about how an 
authority can ensure subjects follow up on his or her requests, about 
how authorities can make us believe that it is legitimate to do something 
which we under other circumstances believe to be wrong. This finding 
helps us understand the Holocaust and other periods of mass atrocities, 
not because obedience is the only explanation, nor because we are 
passive automatons, but because we have a natural tendency to trust 
an authority and follow up on his or her requests. Many critics seem 
to imply that Milgram and other scholars who also argue that obedience 
and conformity play an important role, such as Arendt and Browning, 
are suggesting that the perpetrators were ‘mechanically carrying out 
the murderous commands of their leaders’.146 Yet this is inaccurate.147 
Perpetrators might have participated for many different reasons but 
it is still the context shaped by authority figures that provided them 
with opportunity, motive, and a sense of entitlement. Authorities can 
make people believe that within a certain context hurting or even 
killing people is the right thing. This is precisely what Milgram 
showed us and the reason why his research is so crucial in under-
standing mass atrocities such as the Holocaust.
145  Perry, ‘Seeing is Believing’, p. 624.
146  See Fenigstein, p. 592. 
147  See also Richard Overy, ‘“Ordinary men,” Extraordinary Circumstances: Historians, Social Psychology, 
and the Holocaust’, Journal of Social Issues, 70.3 (2014), 515–30.
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